Epigenetics and Toxic Torts: How Epidemiological Evidence Informs Causation by Laubach, Kerriann
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 73 | Issue 2 Article 8
Spring 4-1-2016
Epigenetics and Toxic Torts: How Epidemiological
Evidence Informs Causation
Kerriann Laubach
Washington and Lee University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Evidence Commons, and the Science and Technology Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of
Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kerriann Laubach, Epigenetics and Toxic Torts: How Epidemiological Evidence Informs Causation, 73
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1019 (2016), https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol73/iss2/8
 
1019 
Epigenetics and Toxic Torts: How 
Epidemiological Evidence Informs 
Causation 
Kerriann Laubach∗ 
Table of Contents 
 I. Introduction ................................................................... 1020 
 II. Scientific Background .................................................... 1024 
  A. Gene Expression and the Epigenome...................... 1024 
  B. Heritability of Epigenetic Change ........................... 1029 
  C. Epigenetics and Disease .......................................... 1030 
 III. Using Scientific Evidence to Prove Causation .............. 1033 
  A. Overview of Causation ............................................ 1033 
  B. The Role of Epidemiological Studies and  
   Scientific Parameters .............................................. 1034 
   1. Relative Risk ...................................................... 1036 
   2. Dose-Response Curves ....................................... 1040 
 IV. Alternative Models of Causation in Toxic Torts ........... 1042 
  A. Merging General and Specific Causation ............... 1042 
  B. Substantial Factor ................................................... 1044 
  C. Sufficient-to-Have-Caused ...................................... 1045 
  D. Increased Risk ......................................................... 1046 
  E. Other Alternatives ................................................... 1049 
 V. Adapting Causation Doctrine to Epigenetic  
  Evidence ......................................................................... 1051 
                                                                                                     
 ∗ J.D. Candidate, Washington and Lee University School of Law, May 
2016. I would like to thank the members of the editorial board, especially Meg 
Sawyer, Krista Consiglio, and Katherine Skilling, for their guidance and 
assistance in shaping this Note. I would also like to thank Professor Massie for 
her invaluable feedback and knowledgeable support in her role as my faculty 
advisor. Finally, I extend my gratitude to my high school AP Biology teacher, 
Mr. Antonelli, for showing our class a video about epigenetics and sparking my 
interest in the field. I dedicate this Note to my parents and dear friends, whose 
steadfast support has shaped all my passions and endeavors.  
1020 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1019 (2016) 
  A. Evidentiary Issues ................................................... 1053 
  B. Increased Risk Framework ..................................... 1055 
  C. Addressing General and Specific Causation ........... 1056 
  D. Difficulties and Alternative Solutions ..................... 1058 
 VI. Conclusion ...................................................................... 1060 
I. Introduction 
Consider the recent tragedy in Flint, Michigan, resulting 
from a contaminated water supply.1 After Flint switched from 
Detroit’s water supply to water from the Flint River, its water 
became tainted with high levels of lead, trihalomethanes, and 
copper—some exceeding the limits in federal regulations.2 Flint is 
a poor city with a majority black population.3 Indeed, financial 
need drove the decision to switch water supplies in the first 
place.4 Instead of saving Flint money, this choice may now prove 
                                                                                                     
 1. See Yanan Wang, In Flint, Mich., There’s So Much Lead in Children’s 
Blood that a State of Emergency Is Declared, WASH. POST (Dec. 15, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/12/15/toxic-water-
soaring-lead-levels-in-childrens-blood-create-state-of-emergency-in-flint-mich/ 
(last visited Feb. 4, 2016) (reporting on the water contamination and lead 
poisoning affecting Flint) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 2. See id. (discussing the levels of contaminants in Flint’s water); see also 
Ron Fonger, City Warns of Potential Health Risks After Flint Water Tests 
Revealed Too Much Disinfection Byproduct, M LIVE (last updated Jan. 17, 2015, 
10:04 AM), http://www.mlive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/01/flint_water_has_ 
high_disinfect.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2016) (“[T]he state Department of 
Environmental Quality issued a notice of violation of the Safe Drinking Water 
Act for maximum contaminant levels for trihalomethanes—or TTHM—a group 
of four chemicals that are formed as a byproduct of disinfecting water.”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 3. See John Eligon, A Question of Environmental Racism in Flint, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 21, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/22/us/a-question-of-
environmental-racism-in-flint.html?_r=0 (last visited Feb. 4, 2016) (“But it is 
indisputable that in Flint, the majority of residents are black and many are 
poor. . . . For civil rights advocates, the health crisis in Flint smacks of what has 
become known as environmental racism.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review).  
 4. See Kemi Fuentes-George, Flint’s Structural Racism: This Is Why 
Providing Poisoned Water to the City’s Citizens Seemed Like a Reasonable Idea, 
SALON (Feb. 7, 2016), http://www.salon.com/2016/02/07/flints_structural_ 
racism_this_is_why_providing_poisoned_water_to_the_citys_citizens_seemed_ 
like_a_reasonable_idea/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2016) (“In an effort to cut corners, 
the state had ‘no choice’ but to abandon any renovations of the dilapidated water 
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far more costly to both the city and the state of Michigan.5 More 
importantly, it burdens the population with lead levels that are 
almost twice as high as they were before the switch, among other 
devastating impacts.6 
Lead exposure causes irreversible damage, including 
behavioral change and neurological impacts, immunotoxicity, and 
“toxicity to the reproductive organs.”7 These harms are especially 
acute for children exposed to lead—like the children in Flint.8 
Recent scientific research shows that the children in Flint will 
face not only physical symptoms, but also changes to how their 
genetic code operates.9 Lead exposure causes changes in gene 
expression that “may not only have immediate dire consequences 
for brain development, but may also have effects that persist 
after the initial exposure.”10 Flint’s population now suffers from 
changes in gene expression predisposing them to neurological 
                                                                                                     
infrastructure, and use the cheapest source of water available, despite 
persistent questions about its suitability.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review).   
5. Estimates of the cost of cleaning the Flint water crisis have ranged 
from $60 million to $300 billion. See, e.g., Matthew Dolan, Flint Water Crisis 
Could Cost U.S. $300 Billion, USA TODAY (Mar. 5, 2016), http://www. 
usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2016/03/05/flint-water-crisis-could-cost-
us-300-billion/81359834/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2016) (discussing the costs of 
replacing water infrastructure and compensating injured plaintiffs) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review); Nick Stockton, Here’s How Hard It Will 
Be to Unpoison Flint’s Water, WIRED (Jan. 29, 2016), 
http://www.wired.com/2016/01/heres-how-hard-it-will-be-to-unpoison-flints-water/ 
(last visited Apr. 4, 2016) (estimating the cost of replacing Flint’s lead pipes to 
be $60 million over fifteen years) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
 6. See Wang, supra note 1 (“The proportion of infants and children with 
above-average levels of lead in their blood has nearly doubled since the city 
switched from the Detroit water system to using the Flint River as its water 
source, in 2014.”). 
 7. Lead Poisoning and Health, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Aug. 2015), 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs379/en/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2016) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 8. Id.  
 9. See Marie-Claude Senut et al., Epigenetics of Early-Life Lead Exposure 
and Effects on Brain Development, 4 EPIGENOMICS 665, 668–69 (2012) 
(discussing how early-life lead exposure changes gene expression, causing not 
only immediate impacts but also leading to late-onset neurological diseases like 
Alzheimer’s).  
 10. Id. at 669. 
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diseases like Alzheimer’s.11 Sadly, the children exposed to lead in 
Flint may even pass this predisposition for disease to their 
grandchildren and great-grandchildren.12  
To obtain compensation for these harms through the legal 
system, an exposed child in Flint—or her descendants—would 
face the obstacle of proving the causal chain between exposure 
and disease onset.13 Toxic tort cases create unique challenges for 
the traditional tort causation model.14 Plaintiffs often must prove 
factual cause in tort through “but-for” causation.15 Yet in toxic 
tort cases, courts typically go beyond this standard to require 
proof of both general and specific causation.16 General causation 
considers “whether the substance at issue had the capacity to 
cause the harm alleged.”17 Plaintiffs must prove general 
causation as a threshold matter.18 Such proof typically relies on 
                                                                                                     
 11. Id. at 669–70.  
 12. See id. at 670 (“[S]ome changes in epigenetic determinants can extend 
to the germline, raising the possibility that [lead]-induced alterations could be 
propagated transgenerationally.”); see also Arko Sen et al., Multigenerational 
Epigenetic Inheritance in Humans: DNA Methylation Changes Associated with 
Maternal Exposure to Lead Can Be Transmitted to the Grandchildren, 5 SCI. 
REP. 1, 6 (2015) (concluding that lead exposure in a pregnant woman can change 
the gene expression patterns of her grandchildren); infra Part II.B (discussing 
the heritability of epigenetic harms).  
 13. See infra Part IV (summarizing how courts handle the causation issue 
in toxic tort cases).  
 14. See Steve C. Gold, When Certainty Dissolves into Probability: A Legal 
Vision of Toxic Causation for the Post-Genomic Era, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 237, 
244 (2013) (“A fundamental difficulty in proving such a claim is that exposure 
and disease usually do not correlate perfectly: some people get sick without 
exposure, and some people receive exposure without getting sick.”). 
 15. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS. AND EMOT. HARM 
§ 26 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“[A]n act is a factual cause of an outcome if, in 
the absence of the act, the outcome would not have occurred.”).  
 16. See Henricksen v. Conoco Phillips Co., 605 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1155 (E.D. 
Wash. 2009) (“Courts in toxic tort cases often separate the causation inquiry 
into general causation and specific causation.”); see also Loren Peck, How Sound 
Is the Science? Applying Daubert to Biomechanical Experts’ Injury Causation 
Opinions, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1063, 1083–86 (2016) (elaborating on the 
difference between general and specific causation and applying Daubert to 
evidence in personal injury cases).  
 17. Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig. v. E. I. Dupont, 292 F.3d 1124, 
1133 (9th Cir. 2002).  
 18. See Gold, supra note 14, at 245 (“Courts initially demand proof of 
‘general causation,’ asking whether the exposure in question is ever a sine qua 
non for the plaintiff’s disease, or whether the existence of cases of disease after 
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epidemiological data at the population level rather than data 
specific to an individual plaintiff’s injury.19 Epidemiological data 
results from population-level studies that determine the 
connection, if any, between diseases and environmental 
exposures or conditions.20  
In contrast, specific causation “refers to whether a particular 
individual suffers from a particular ailment as a result of 
exposure to a substance.”21 Once plaintiffs prove general 
causation, they must also prove their individual exposure to the 
substance and the causal chain leading to their resulting injury.22 
Toxic tort cases often fail to prove specific causation because the 
biological mechanisms of exposure and disease are unknown or 
uncertain.23 
Epigenetics—an emerging scientific field—provides a new 
causal mechanism for connecting disease to environmental toxin 
exposures.24 Epigenetics refers to the study of “heritable changes 
                                                                                                     
exposure is merely coincidental.”).  
 19. See Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 715–17 (Tex. 
1997) (summarizing the different standards that courts use to determine 
causation based on epidemiological evidence).   
 20. Id. at 715 (“Epidemiological studies examine existing populations to 
attempt to determine if there is an association between a disease or condition 
and a factor suspected of causing that disease or condition.”).   
 21. Hanford, 292 F.3d at 1133. 
 22. See Mitchell v. Gencorp, Inc., 165 F.3d 778, 781 (10th Cir. 1999) (“It is 
well established that a plaintiff in a toxic tort case must prove that he or she 
was exposed to and injured by a harmful substance manufactured by the 
defendant.”); Wright v. Willamette Indus., 91 F.3d 1105, 1106 (8th Cir. 1996) 
(“[A] plaintiff in a toxic tort case must prove . . . the plaintiff’s actual level of 
exposure to the defendant’s toxic substance before he or she may recover.”); 
Allen v. Pa. Eng’g Corp., 102 F.3d 194, 199 (5th Cir. 1996) (“Scientific knowledge 
of the harmful level of exposure to a chemical, plus knowledge that the plaintiff 
was exposed to such quantities, are minimal facts necessary to sustain the 
plaintiffs’ burden in a toxic tort case.”). 
 23. See June v. Union Carbide Corp., 577 F.3d 1234, 1245 (10th Cir. 2009) 
(noting that the plaintiffs failed to present evidence that exposure to radiation 
“was either a but-for cause of any medical condition . . . or . . . a necessary 
component of a causal set that would probably have caused one of those 
conditions”); see also Gold, supra note 14, at 250–52 (discussing the nearly 
“impossible task” of proving but-for causation in toxic tort cases).   
 24. See Laura S. Rozek et al., Epigenetics: Relevance and Implications for 
Public Health, 35 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 105, 107 (2014) (“Molecular 
epidemiology is a useful approach for linking exposures and disease in human 
populations.”). 
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in gene expression that are not due to any alteration in the DNA 
sequence.”25 A variety of chemicals and environmental conditions 
cause adverse health effects through epigenetic mechanisms.26 
These changes therefore provide an intermediate causal link 
between exposure (and risk creation) and the onset of disease.27 
Epigenetics provides an opportunity for courts to reframe the 
causation issue for toxic torts, particularly when considering 
liability for increased risk of disease.28 This Note argues for 
courts to accept epigenetic harm as present physical injury for an 
increased risk claim and recommends that courts submit 
epidemiological evidence to the fact-finders without arbitrary 
legal cutoffs for scientific rigor. 
Part II of this Note provides a scientific background and 
summarizes the current state of epigenetics research. Part III 
summarizes the primary challenges of proving causation in toxic 
tort cases and how courts address these challenges by modifying 
the existing causation framework. Part IV discusses how 
epigenetics can inform the causation inquiry in toxic torts cases 
and argues for modifying the increased risk framework according 
to scientific development.  
II. Scientific Background 
A. Gene Expression and the Epigenome 
“Gene expression” refers to the process of producing proteins 
from the underlying DNA sequence—which is also known as the 
genetic code or genome.29 Epigenetics describes the regulation of 
                                                                                                     
 25. Manel Esteller, Molecular Origins of Cancer: Epigenetics in Cancer, 358 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1148, 1148 (2008). 
 26. See Andrea Baccarelli & Valentina Bollati, Epigenetics and 
Environmental Chemicals, 21 CURRENT OP. PEDIATRICS 243, 244–49 (2009) 
(summarizing the epigenetic impacts of various environmental chemicals). 
 27. See Rozek, supra note 24, at 108 (describing how epigenetics can be 
used to “identify relevant markers for translational studies of disease prediction 
and treatment in human populations”). 
 28. See Gold, supra note 14, at 299–302 (discussing how courts might 
reframe increased risk and causation as science reveals the cellular changes 
leading to disease symptoms).    
 29. See E.R. Gibney & C.M. Nolan, Epigenetics and Gene Expression, 105 
HEREDITY 4, 4–5 (2010) (providing an overview of the steps involved in gene 
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this process.30 Genes can be activated or silenced—turned “on” or 
“off”—meaning they do or do not produce protein.31 Genes can 
also be up-regulated or down-regulated, meaning they generate 
more or less of their protein product.32 These changes in gene 
expression can have positive, negative, or neutral effects on 
health.33 For example, epigenetic changes can serve a protective 
function by allowing an organism to adapt quickly to 
environmental cues.34 They can silence genes that are likely to 
cause disease.35 Epigenetic change can, however, also lead to 
serious diseases—when silencing genes with a protective 
function, for example.36  
Many different biological and chemical pathways regulate 
gene expression.37 Although the underlying molecular DNA 
                                                                                                     
expression).  
 30. See David Rodenhiser & Mellissa Mann, Epigenetics and Human 
Disease: Translating Basic Biology into Clinical Applications, 174 CAN. MED. 
ASS’N J. 341, 341 (2006) (“[Epigenetics] is the study of heritable changes in gene 
function that do not change the DNA sequence but, rather, provide an ‘extra’ 
layer of transcriptional control that regulates how genes are expressed.”). 
 31. See id. (“Changes to the structure of chromatin influence gene 
expression: genes are inactivated (switched off) when the chromatin is 
condensed (silent), and they are expressed (switched on) when chromatin is open 
(active).”). 
 32.  See Gerda Egger et al., Epigenetics in Human Disease and Prospects 
for Epigenetic Therapy, 429 NATURE 457, 460–61 (2004) (describing the up-
regulation and down-regulation of different genes associated with cancers); 
Mark A. Rothstein et al., The Ghost in Our Genes: Legal and Ethical 
Implications of Epigenetics, 19 HEALTH MATRIX 1, 5 (2009) (“While epigenetic 
changes can result in changes in the expression of . . . traits, they do so not by 
changing the form or function of gene products, but by altering the timing and 
quantity of their production in tissues at key points in time.”).  
 33. See Rothstein et al., supra note 32, at 7–21 (providing an overview of 
normal and abnormal epigenetic changes in cells). 
 34. See id. at 10 (“Such mechanisms allow a developing organism to adjust 
its phenotype to its anticipated environment, thereby increasing its 
fitness . . . .”).  
 35. See id. at 8 (noting that a normal role of the epigenome is to silence 
“disruptive sequences” that are likely to mutate and cause cancer or other 
diseases).  
 36. See Randy L. Jirtle & Michael K. Skinner, Environmental Epigenomics 
and Disease Susceptibility, 8 NATURE REVS. GENETICS 253, 257 (2007) (describing 
how a single epigenetic change can silence a protective tumor-suppressor gene 
and result in higher cancer risk).  
 37. See Edith Heard & Robert A. Martienssen, Transgenerational 
Epigenetic Inheritance: Myths and Mechanisms, 157 CELL 95, 99 (2005) 
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sequence—As, Ts, Cs, and Gs38—remains the same, epigenetic 
changes shape an organism’s traits, health, and development.39 
The more common epigenetic modifications involve chemical 
changes to the DNA sequence that tighten or loosen the DNA 
structure (known as chromatin) itself.40 These structural changes 
affect the ease of creating protein product from the gene 
sequence.41 With a more compact structure, the biological 
machinery needed to create proteins has more difficulty attaching 
to the DNA, creating less or no protein product.42 A more open 
structure, however, allows for easier binding and “reading” of the 
DNA sequence, leading to more protein product.43 The 
illustration below shows some different structures of DNA.44 
                                                                                                     
(summarizing a variety of epigenetic mechanisms).  
 38. These letters refer to the nucleotide building blocks of DNA that pair to 
create the double-helix structure: adenine, thymine, cytosine, and guanine. See 
generally Leslie A. Pray, Discovery of DNA Structure and Function: Watson and 
Crick, 1 NATURE EDUC. 100 (2008), 
http://www.nature.com/scitable/topicpage/discovery-of-dna-structure-and-
function-watson-397.   
 39. See Rothstein et al., supra note 32, at 5 (“Changes in determining 
which genes are expressed and their degree of expression can have dramatic 
effects on the development and characteristics of an organism.”).  
 40. See Rodenhiser, supra note 30, at 341 (discussing the basic chemical 
modifications to DNA structure and their impacts on gene expression).  
 41. See id. (describing how the epigenome guides the process of creating 
protein from genes).  
 42. See id. (discussing the impacts of condensed chromatin on gene 
expression).  
 43. See id. (discussing the impacts of open chromatin on gene expression).  
 44. Figure reprinted from Rodenhiser, supra note 30, at 342.  
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The “epigenome” refers to all of the epigenetic changes in an 
organism.45 Such changes explain why organisms with identical 
DNA sequences can exhibit different physical characteristics and 
“different susceptibilities to a disease.”46 The underlying gene 
sequence is analogous “to the hardware of a computer, whereas 
epigenetic information has been compared to computer software 
that controls the operation of the hardware.”47  
Epigenetic changes occur normally in cells.48 Their most 
important role, for example, is controlling cell differentiation.49 
Although every cell in the human body has the same underlying 
                                                                                                     
45. See Rothstein et al., supra note 39, at 6 (“Each epigenetic change is 
referred to as a ‘mark,’ and the total set of epigenetic marks in an organism is 
referred to as the epigenome.”). 
46. Esteller, supra note 25, at 1148.  
47. Rothstein et al., supra note 39, at 3.   
48. See id. at 7–11 (discussing the role of epigenetic programming in cells 
through normal development); see also Esteller, supra note 25, at 1148 (“DNA 
methylation has critical roles in the control of gene activity and the architecture 
of the nucleus of the cell.”).  
 49. See Rothstein et al., supra note 39, at 7 (“The primary function of 
epigenetic programming is to control cell differentiation through differential 
gene expression.”). 
Open chromatin 
structure, allowing for 





impeding the creation 
of protein.  
Figure 1 
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DNA sequence, different cells serve very different purposes 
through differential gene expression.50  
From an evolutionary perspective, the epigenome also allows 
quick adaptation to environmental cues.51 For example, rat pups 
with mothers who failed to nurse properly show an increased 
stress response later in life.52 These mothers’ nursing failures 
likely resulted from some environmental threat, and the pups 
face the same environment.53 The rat pups inherited some 
epigenetic markers from their mother, and their mother’s 
behavior further shaped their epigenomes.54 These epigenetic 
changes create nervous offspring, who will be better prepared to 
react to environmental threats and should survive longer.55 
However, disease and other problems arise when epigenetic 
changes fail to match environmental stressors—usually as a 
result of mixed environmental cues or epigenetic modifications 
inherited from parents.56 The rat pups, for example, may face a 
                                                                                                     
 50. See id. at 7–8 (“Yet, different cell types, whether skin cells, muscle 
cells, bone cells, or nerve cells, display markedly different properties due to 
different sets of genes being turned on or off.”). 
 51. See Graham C. Burdge & Karen A. Lillycrop, Nutrition, Epigenetics, 
and Developmental Plasticity: Implications for Understanding Human Disease, 
30 ANN. REV. NUTRITION 315, 330–31 (2010) (discussing examples where 
epigenetic changes from environmental cues enhance organism fitness); 
Rothstein et al., supra note 39, at 9 (“[E]pigenetics provides a mechanism for a 
developing organism, either in utero or post-natally, to assess its environment 
and adjust its genetic response accordingly.”). 
 52. See Burdge & Lillycrop, supra note 51, at 330 (summarizing epigenetic 
changes that likely increase evolutionary fitness).  
 53. See Ian C.G. Weaver et al., Epigenetic Programming by Maternal 
Behavior, 7 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 847, 852 (2004) (“Such effects commonly 
follow from the exposure of the mother to the same or similar forms of threat 
and may represent examples whereby the experience of the mother is translated 
through an epigenetic mechanism of inheritance into phenotypic variation in the 
offspring.”).  
 54. See, e.g., I. Mendizabal et al., Epigenetics and Evolution, 54 
INTEGRATIVE & COMP. BIOLOGY 31, 31 (2014) (noting that epigenetic changes 
include those that arise from environmental cues during an organism’s lifespan 
and those transmitted through generations).  
 55. See Burdge & Lillycrop, supra note 51, at 330 (“More nervous offspring 
may be less susceptible to being stalked by predators.”).  
 56. See id. at 317 (“[A]n incorrect prediction, such as may occur if maternal 
nutrition is adequate but placental function is suboptimal, would result in 
mismatch between the physiology of the offspring and the future environment. 
Such mismatch has been suggested to underlie cardio-metabolic disease in 
humans.”). 
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different environment than their mother did—one where an 
overactive stress response becomes burdensome rather than 
advantageous.  
B. Heritability of Epigenetic Change 
Epigenetic changes have been shown to persist over many 
generations of offspring.57 Unlike the underlying DNA sequence, 
a mammal’s epigenome is subject to “reprogramming” or 
“resetting” in the embryo stage.58 Most of the epigenetic marks 
are erased and reset early in development.59 However, not all of 
the epigenetic changes are subject to this process, meaning that 
some are passed through generations.60 The epigenome can have 
both transgenerational and intergenerational effects.61 
Intergenerational effects describe those passed along to 
organisms that were exposed to an environmental factor in 
utero—a mother and child have the same epigenetic change.62 
Transgenerational effects, however, describe those that persist 
beyond generations exposed to the environmental factor—an 
organism and its great-grandparent have the same epigenetic 
change.63 Some epigenetic modifications have persisted for 
hundreds of years in plant species and for over forty generations 
in some animals.64 Studies have shown epigenetic changes from 
toxin exposure persisting for up to four generations.65 Most 
                                                                                                     
 57. See Heard & Martienssen, supra note 37, at 95 (summarizing studies 
showing intergenerational and transgenerational effects of epigenetic change).   
 58. Mendizabal et al., supra note 54, at 37.  
 59. Id.  
 60. See, e.g., id. (discussing studies of plants and animals which revealing 
that “some epigenetic marks escape epigenetic reprogramming”).  
 61. See Heard & Martienssen, supra note 37, at 96 (“[I]t is important to 
distinguish [intergenerational] effects, such as the impact of in utero exposure 
to particular . . . environments . . . from truly transgenerational effects that are 
found in generations that were not exposed to the initial signal or environment 
that triggered the change.”).  
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. See id. at 103 (discussing examples of transgenerational effects in 
different types of organisms).  
 65. See Matthew D. Anway et al., Epigenetic Transgenerational Actions of 
Endocrine Disruptors and Male Fertility, 308 SCI. 1466, 1466 (2005) (noting that 
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human studies have focused on intergenerational impacts, and 
further research is needed on both transgenerational and 
intergenerational effects.66 Even so, research firmly establishes 
the impact of environmental cues on individuals throughout all 
stages of development.67 Because the science on intergenerational 
harms is still developing, this Note addresses epigenetic harms in 
only the generation exposed to a toxin.68  
C. Epigenetics and Disease 
A variety of chemicals and environmental conditions cause 
epigenetic changes that lead to adverse health effects.69 Some 
toxins linked to specific epigenetic changes include: lead, arsenic, 
cadmium, nickel, chromium, methylmercury, air pollutants, 
benzene, BPA, trichloroethylene, arsenic, and persistent organic 
pollutants.70 The study of epigenetics reveals a number of 
biological mechanisms connecting exposure to substances like 
these with disease symptoms.71 For example, many different 
                                                                                                     
endocrine disruptors caused “transgenerational defects in spermatogenic 
capacity and sperm viability”); Mohan Manikkam et al., Transgenerational 
Actions of Environmental Compounds on Reproductive Disease and 
Identification of Epigenetic Biomarkers of Ancestral Exposures, PLOS ONE, Feb. 
2012, at 5 (“[T]he current study has established the transgenerational actions of 
these compounds . . . .”). 
 66. See Heard & Martienssen, supra note 37, at 105 (discussing the 
evidence for intergenerational and transgenerational effects in human 
populations). 
 67. See id. (“[D]ifferent nutritional cues during infancy and childhood can 
have adverse effects during adult life, and exposure to pollutants, alcohol, and 
tobacco can affect fetal programming. . . . [A] wide range of environmental 
conditions during embryonic development and early life determine susceptibility 
to disease during adult life.”). 
 68. See infra Part V (discussing how epigenetic evidence can be used to 
prove causation in cases where a plaintiff is exposed to a toxin). 
 69. See Baccarelli & Bollati, supra note 26, at 244–49 (summarizing the 
epigenetic impacts of various substances, including heavy metals, air pollution, 
endocrine disruptors, and other environmental contaminants). 
 70. See, e.g., id. at 247 (providing a table of the epigenetic effects of various 
environmental chemicals).   
 71. See id. at 249 (“Epigenetics holds substantial potential for developing 
biological markers to predict which exposures would put exposed individuals at 
risk and which individuals will be more susceptible to develop disease.”). 
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cancer tumors show abnormal epigenetic marks.72 Certain 
epigenetic changes can even be used to predict cancer patient 
outcomes and responses to treatment.73 The table below provides 
a summary of some human diseases that have been linked to 
epigenetic abnormalities, with the “biological process” column 
indicating the type of epigenetic change that was found.74  
                                                                                                     
 72. See Esteller, supra note 25, at 1152 (listing “epigenetic aberrations” 
across thirteen types of cancers in Table 1).  
 73. See id. at 1155 (noting that certain epigenetic marks “can be indicators 
of the prognosis in patients with cancer” and act as “a predictor of the response 
to treatment”); Dieter Weichenhan & Christoph Plass, The Evolving Epigenome, 
22 HUM. MOLECULAR GENETICS R1, R2 (2013) (“Cancer-specific DNA methylation 
can serve as a marker for early detection of a disease or as a prognostic marker 
that helps to classify tumor subgroups with different biological or clinical 
features.”).  
 74. Table reprinted from Rodenhiser & Mann, supra note 30, at 344.   
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This table summarizes just a few of the scientific studies 
linking epigenetic changes to disease.75 Epigenetics therefore 
provides a scientific link between exposure to toxic chemicals and 
                                                                                                     
 75. See Arline T. Geronimus, Deep Integration: Letting the Epigenome Out 
of the Bottle Without Losing Sight of the Structural Origins of Population 
Health, 103 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S56, S56 (2013) (discussing the relationships 
between epigenetic changes and population health). 
Table 1: Associations Between Epigenetic Modifications and 
Human Diseases and Conditions  
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disease onset.76 The interplay between the genome and the 
epigenome provides another layer of complication, as certain 
genes may even create a propensity for abnormal epigenetic 
changes.77 Scientific research, however, will continue to link 
toxins to epigenetic markers, and epigenetic markers to certain 
diseases. The legal issue, then, becomes how to consider these 
markers in the causation analysis. 
III. Using Scientific Evidence to Prove Causation  
A. Overview of Causation 
Plaintiffs in toxic tort cases face great difficulty proving 
specific causation.78 Most courts follow the but-for test for 
causation in tort cases: “Conduct is a factual cause of harm when 
the harm would not have occurred absent the conduct.”79 This 
test fits poorly with the factual progression of the typical toxic 
tort case—exposure, followed by a long latency period, only some 
of the exposed falling ill, and many possible contributing causes.80 
Environmentally caused diseases do not follow a simple but-for 
model of causation.81 As a result, courts and scholars have 
suggested alternative tests for evaluating causation in toxic tort 
cases.82  
                                                                                                     
 76. See Baccarelli & Bollati, supra note 26, at 244–49 (noting chemicals 
that have been linked to epigenetic change and disease). 
 77. See Rodenhiser & Mann, supra note 30, at 343 (“People’s sensitivity to 
diet or to environmental toxins may vary owing to pre-existing genetic variants 
that can challenge methyl metabolism and predispose a person to epigenetic 
change.”). 
 78. See Gold, supra note 14, at 245–52 (discussing obstacles to proving 
causation in toxic injury cases).   
 79. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 26 (2014).  
 80. See Gold, supra note 14, at 244 (“[E]xposure and disease usually do not 
correlate perfectly: some people get sick without exposure, and some people 
receive exposure without getting sick. In marked contrast to traumatic injury 
cases, the disease process itself is unobserved and unobservable as it occurs, and 
inscrutable afterward.”). 
 81. See, e.g., Fazal Khan, Preserving Human Potential as Freedom: A 
Framework for Regulating Epigenetic Harms, 20 HEALTH MATRIX 259, 283 
(2010) (“From a biological perspective, the concept of disease as a spectrum 
rather than a binary on/off event is logical.”). 
 82. See infra Part IV (summarizing how courts have modified causation 
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Most tort cases require plaintiffs to prove causation by the 
preponderance of the evidence, meaning that plaintiffs must 
show a degree of certainty over fifty percent for the fact-finder to 
find for the plaintiff.83 Different courts follow different 
approaches to reaching this proof threshold for the causation 
issue. Some states require evidence of both general and specific 
causation—sometimes referred to as a “strong” view of 
causation.84 A minority of states allow a plaintiff to prove 
causation based solely on evidence of general causation—
sometimes referred to as a “weak” view of causation.85 How a 
court considers population-level data (as opposed to 
plaintiff-specific data) becomes a key difference between these 
approaches.  
B. The Role of Epidemiological Studies and Scientific Parameters 
Most scientific evidence in toxic tort cases involves 
epidemiological studies, which examine the relationship between 
environmental factors and disease.86 Different states demand 
different standards for allowing epidemiological data to prove 
general or specific causation.87 As with any evidence, 
epidemiological studies face the threshold legal issues of 
admissibility and sufficiency.88 Admissibility refers to whether or 
                                                                                                     
doctrine to fit toxic tort cases). 
 83. See David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: 
A “Public Law” Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 851, 857–58 (1984) 
(discussing how different courts approach proof of causation in toxic tort cases). 
 84. See In re “Agent Orange” Prods. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1261 
(E.D.N.Y. 1985) (noting that a plaintiff must “offer both epidemiologic evidence 
that the probability of causation exceeds fifty percent in the exposed population 
and ‘particularistic’ proof that the conduct complained of caused him harm 
individually”).   
 85. See Rosenberg, supra note 83, at 857–58 (noting that a “weak version” 
of causation “authorizes verdicts founded solely on statistical evidence”).  
 86. See Magistrini v. One Hour Martinizing Dry Cleaning, 180 F. Supp. 2d 
584, 590–91 (D.N.J. 2002) (“Epidemiological studies attempt to identify agents 
that are associated with an increased risk of disease.”). 
 87. See infra Part IV (addressing the different approaches that courts use 
in considering epidemiological evidence). 
 88. See Michael D. Green, D. Michal Freedman & Leon Gordis, Reference 
Guide on Epidemiology, in FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL ON 
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 549, 610 (3d ed. 2011) (“Two legal issues arise with regard 
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not a court should consider the study as evidence, while 
sufficiency refers to how much weight a court gives a study when 
considering the plaintiff’s case.89  
Scientific evidence usually meets the admissibility standard 
more easily than it meets the sufficiency standard.90 The 
admissibility of expert evidence in federal courts is governed by 
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and the cases of Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,91 Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,92 
and General Electric Co. v. Joiner93.94 Within these boundaries, 
though, some scholars and courts require only a low bar for 
admissibility: “An epidemiologic study that is sufficiently rigorous 
to justify a conclusion that it is scientifically valid should be 
admissible, as it tends to make an issue in dispute more or less 
likely.”95 Generally, plaintiffs do not face strict bars to the 
admissibility of epidemiological data. 
Courts become stricter when dealing with the issue of 
sufficiency of evidence, often following bright-line cutoffs 
according to certain scientific parameters, such as relative risk or 
dose-response curves.96 Relative risk represents the increased 
                                                                                                     
to the role of epidemiology in proving individual causation: admissibility and 
sufficiency of evidence to meet the burden of production.”). 
 89. Id. at 610–11. 
 90. See, e.g., id. (“[Admissibility] tends to receive less attention by the 
courts but nevertheless deserves mention.”); Tumlinson v. Advanced Micro 
Devices, Inc., No. 08C-07-106 FSS, 2012 Del. Super. LEXIS 209, at *14 (Del. 
Super. Ct. Jan. 6, 2012) (“Some jurisdictions follow [a bright-line rule for 
admissibility]. Others accept the statistical significance requirements as a 
measure of evidentiary sufficiency, but not as a threshold for admissibility. And, 
others merely require a positive association, relying on the jury to determine the 
significance of the studies after proper instruction.”); Ellis v. Int’l Playtex, Inc., 
745 F.2d 292, 303 (4th Cir. 1984) (“Playtex’s concern about the methodology of 
the studies should have been addressed to the relative weight accorded the 
evidence and not its admissibility.”). 
 91. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).  
 92. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).  
 93. 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
 94. A thorough discussion on the admissibility of scientific evidence under 
these rules and precedents is beyond the scope of this Note. For an overview of 
these issues, see 29 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR JAMES GOLD, FED. PRAC. & 
PROC. § 6266 (Supp. 2012). See also Peck, supra note 16, at 1072–76 
(summarizing the Daubert standard).  
 95. Green, supra note 88, at 610.  
 96. See id. at 612 (discussing how courts handle evidence related to relative 
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risk of disease faced by people exposed to a certain substance.97 A 
dose-response curve represents how this risk changes with 
increasing exposure.98 Texas, for example, requires a relative risk 
of 2.0 or greater before allowing epidemiological data to satisfy 
even general causation.99 The relevance of these two parameters 
for toxic tort cases is explained further below. 
1. Relative Risk 
Epidemiological data typically yields a factor known as 
“relative risk”100:  
Relative risk indicates the difference in risk of contracting a 
disease in people exposed to a risk factor, as compared to those 
not exposed (but otherwise similar). Determining the relative 
risk is important in understanding the results of a study 
because virtually every disease associated with a risk factor 
also occurs, at some rate, in the general population not 
exposed to the risk factor.101 
To calculate a relative risk factor, scientists divide the risk of 
developing a disease in a group exposed to an environmental 
factor by the risk of developing a disease in a similar group that 
is not exposed.102 For example, if 9 out of 100 people develop a 
disease while taking a particular drug, but 6 out of 100 people not 
on the drug also develop the disease, the relative risk would be 
                                                                                                     
risk of disease). 
 97. Magistrini v. One Hour Martinizing Dry Cleaning, 180 F. Supp. 2d 584, 
591 (D.N.J. 2002). 
 98. McClain v. Metabolite Int’l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1233, 1241 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 99. See Merck & Co. v. Garza, 347 S.W.3d 256, 265 (Tex. 2011) (“[W]hen 
parties attempt to prove general causation using epidemiological evidence, a 
threshold requirement of reliability is that the evidence demonstrate a 
statistically significant doubling of the risk.”). 
 100. See Estate of George v. Vt. League of Cities & Towns, 993 A.2d 367, 374 
(Vt. 2010) (noting that epidemiological data quantifies “the degree of association 
between a given substance and a disease by assigning a ‘relative risk’ factor to 
the association”).  
 101. Magistrini, 180 F. Supp. 2d at 591. 
 102. See id. (noting that relative risk factors are “calculated by dividing the 
risk of developing a disease observed in an exposed group by the risk observed 
in an unexposed, but otherwise similar group”).  
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.09/.06 = 1.5.103 If both groups show the same occurrence of 
disease, then the risks are identical, the relative risk is 1.0, and 
the factor does not correlate with a higher incidence of disease.104 
A relative risk of 2.0, known as “doubling of the risk,” means that 
the group exposed to a toxin showed twice as many individuals 
with disease as the unexposed group.105 Therefore, courts have 
determined that a relative risk over 2.0 supports the assertion 
that a “plaintiff’s disease was more likely than not caused by the 
implicated agent.”106 Accordingly, a number of courts require a 
relative risk of 2.0 or greater for a plaintiff to satisfy the burden 
of proof on general causation.107 Courts that allow epidemiological 
data to satisfy specific causation—the “weak” view—may also 
require plaintiffs to meet a relative risk cutoff of 2.0.108 The Third 
Restatement of Torts follows this model, requiring a relative risk 
of over 2.0 before an epidemiological study may be submitted to 
the jury for specific causation.109 
                                                                                                     
 103. See, e.g., Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 717 
(Tex. 1997) (providing a sample calculation for relative risk).  
 104. See Magistrini v. One Hour Martinizing Dry Cleaning, 180 F. Supp. 2d 
584, 591 (D.N.J. 2002) (“If the risks of the unexposed and exposed are the same, 
then the relative risk estimate (which mathematically is simply the former 
divided by the latter) is 1.0. This . . . indicates that exposure is not associated 
with the disease in that study.”).  
 105. Green et al., supra note 88, at 612. 
 106. Id.  
 107. See Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 717 (“[W]e are persuaded . . . that there is a 
rational basis for relating the requirement that there be more than a ‘doubling 
of the risk’ to our no evidence standard of review and to the more likely than not 
burden of proof.”); Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1403 (D. 
Or. 1996) (“In epidemiological terms, Oregon’s standard of proof means that 
plaintiffs must be able to show a relative risk of greater than 2.0.”); DeLuca v. 
Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 958 (3d Cir. 1990) (“[T]he relative risk 
of limb reduction defects arising from the epidemiological data Done relies upon 
will, at a minimum, have to exceed ‘2.’”).  
 108. See Tumlinson v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., No. 08C-07-106 FSS, 
2012 Del. Super. LEXIS 209, at *7 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 6, 2012) (“[S]cientists 
may not be able to determine exactly what caused the plaintiff’s injury. But, 
scientifically reliable epidemiological studies may provide evidence of causation 
if they establish that exposure to the toxin more than doubles the risk of injury 
in the general population.”).  
 109. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS. AND EMOT. HARM 
§ 28(a) cmt. (c)(4) (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“[W]hen there is group-based evidence 
finding that exposure to an agent causes an incidence of disease in the exposed 
group that is more than twice the incidence in the unexposed group, the 
evidence is sufficient to . . . permit submission of specific causation to a jury.”). 
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Texas courts, for example, require a doubling of the risk for 
epidemiological data to satisfy either general or specific 
causation.110 Additionally, Texas courts require that studies 
demonstrate this risk as statistically significant at a 95% 
confidence level, another statistical parameter for measuring 
scientific rigor.111 In one Texas products liability case, plaintiffs 
sued for a wrongful death, alleging that it was caused by a 
prescription anti-inflammatory drug.112 The court barred recovery 
because the plaintiffs failed to present epidemiological studies 
that met the Texas standard for “scientific reliability,” namely, a 
relative risk over two and statistical significance at a 95% 
confidence level.113 The court rejected the plaintiffs’ offered 
studies after a lengthy discussion of their scientific rigor, 
concluding that none of the studies properly represented the 
decedent’s dosage and duration of the drug.114 The court went on 
to reject the plaintiff’s argument that “the totality of the 
evidence” could be used to prove general causation even where 
individual scientific studies failed to meet Texas’s rigorous 
standard.115  
Depending on the evidence and facts of a specific case, this 
doubling of the risk standard may be an inappropriate barrier to 
proving a plaintiff’s case: “[T]here are a number of reasons why 
reliance on a relative risk of 2.0 as a bright-line boundary would 
not be in accordance with sound scientific methodology in some 
cases. Careful exploration and explication of what is reliable 
                                                                                                     
 110. See Merck & Co. v. Garza, 347 S.W.3d 256, 265 (Tex. 2011) (“[W]hen 
parties attempt to prove general causation using epidemiological evidence, a 
threshold requirement of reliability is that the evidence demonstrate a 
statistically significant doubling of the risk.”). 
 111. See id. (“We concluded that any study that did not find a doubling of 
the risk that was statistically significant at the 95% confidence level was 
unreliable.”).  
 112. See id. at 259 (“Respondents contend that Vioxx, a prescription drug, 
caused their decedent’s death.”).  
 113. See id. at 267–68 (discussing the plaintiff’s failure to present adequate 
scientific evidence supporting general causation).  
 114. See id. at 266–68 (summarizing the studies and emphasizing the 
“differences in dose and duration compared to [the decedent’s] exposure”).  
 115. See id. at 268 (“The totality of the evidence cannot prove general 
causation if it does not meet the standards for scientific reliability established 
by Havner. A plaintiff cannot prove causation by presenting different types of 
unreliable evidence.”). 
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scientific methodology in a given context is necessary.”116 A 
certain relative risk cutoff may also be misleading when a 
plaintiff has a genetic or epigenetic susceptibility to a particular 
substance.117 If a plaintiff has a genetic or epigenetic marker 
revealing susceptibility to a substance, then a study’s relative 
risk may underestimate the risk that the individual plaintiff 
faces from exposure. On the other hand, if a plaintiff lacks a 
common genetic or epigenetic marker contributing to a disease, 
then a study’s relative risk may underestimate the contribution 
that exposure had to that particular disease.118 Because of these 
types of ambiguities, some courts take a more holistic approach to 
determining evidentiary sufficiency.119 New Jersey courts, for 
example, will not exclude an expert’s testimony merely because 
she relies on studies with a relative risk below 2.0.120 The New 
Jersey Superior Court emphasized the importance of leaving the 
evidentiary weight issues to the fact-finder.121 Following this 
precedent, the New Jersey Supreme Court further elaborated: 
“[A] relative risk of 2.0 is not so much a password to a finding of 
causation as one piece of evidence, among others, for the court to 
consider in determining whether the expert has employed a 
sound methodology in reaching his or her conclusion.”122 Other 
courts have similarly given the jury more discretion in 
determining causation, finding a specific cutoff to be entirely 
arbitrary.123 
                                                                                                     
 116. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 719 (Tex. 1997).  
 117. See Green, supra note 88, at 616–17 (noting the possible impact of 
genetic contributions to a plaintiff’s risk).  
 118. See id. (“[G]enetics might be known to be responsible for 50% of the 
incidence of a disease independent of exposure to the agent. If genetics can be 
ruled out in an individual’s case, then a relative risk greater than 1.5 might be 
sufficient . . . .”).  
 119. See id. at 616 (discussing how some courts handle additional factors 
that may affect the causation inquiry). 
 120. See Grassis v. Johns-Manville Corp., 591 A.2d 671, 676–77 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1991) (“In the case before us we need not, for the reasons stated 
earlier, set any risk factor limitation at 2.0 or any other arbitrary number. The 
total basis for the expert’s opinion must be scrutinized.”). 
 121. See id. at 676 (noting the importance of “the resolution of the issue by a 
jury”).  
 122. Landrigan v. Celotex Corp., 605 A.2d 1079, 1087 (N.J. 1992).  
 123. See, e.g., In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig. v. U.S. Mineral Prods. 
Co., 52 F.3d 1124, 1134 (2d Cir. 1995) (“We believe that it would be far 
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2. Dose-Response Curves 
Toxic tort cases also rely heavily on expert evidence 
regarding the dose-response curve, which shows the relationship 
between relative risk and exposure.124 These curves demonstrate 
how “a change in amount, intensity, or duration of exposure to an 
agent is associated with a change—either an increase or 
decrease—in risk of disease.”125 If a plaintiff can prove exposure 
to a certain level of a substance, and a well-known dose-response 
curve exists, then this provides strong evidence for causation.126 
The figure below provides a sample dose-response curve, showing 
two different types of relationships between exposure and 
disease.127 The straight line represents how the risk of disease 
increases steadily with each additional dose (exposure) of a 
particular agent.128 The curved line shows the relationship for an 
agent with some threshold level of exposure.129 People can be 
exposed to some dose without any risk, but once the dose meets a 
threshold, the risk increases sharply with additional exposure.130 
At some point, the dose becomes so high that a maximum level of 
risk has been reached, and the curve levels off again because 
                                                                                                     
preferable for the district court to instruct the jury on statistical significance 
and then let the jury decide whether many studies over the 1.0 mark have any 
significance in combination.”); Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247, 418 (D. 
Utah 1984) (“The value of the available statistical data concerning radiation and 
cancer in off-site communities is not confined by arbitrary tests of ‘statistical 
significance.’ Nor is the court constrained by simplistic models of causal 
probability impressed upon the judicial ‘preponderance of the evidence’ 
standard.”), rev’d on other grounds, 816 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1987).  
 124. See McClain v. Metabolite Int’l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1233, 1241 (11th Cir. 
2005) (“When analyzing an expert’s methodology in toxic tort cases, the court 
should pay careful attention to the expert’s testimony about 
the dose-response relationship.”). 
 125. Green et al., supra note 105, at 622. 
 126. See, e.g., Cano v. Everest Minerals Corp., 362 F. Supp. 2d 814, 848–49 
(W.D. Tex. 2005) (discussing the usefulness of dose-response curves in proving 
causation and considering the plaintiffs’ offered dose-response evidence). 
 127.  Figure reprinted from Bernard D. Goldstein & Mary Sue Henifin, 
Reference Guide on Toxicology, in FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REFERENCE 
MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 633, 643 (3d ed. 2011). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id.  
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there is little more that additional exposure can cause.131 For 
some substances, the dose response curves become very complex, 
and courts struggle with how to weigh expert opinions on 
dose-response relationships.132 
 
Although these curves are useful for quantifying disease risk, 
they can vary for each individual, depending on genetic, 
epigenetic, and environmental factors—and a combination of all 
three.133 As with relative risk data, courts should consider 
dose-response curves in concert with all available evidence rather 
                                                                                                     
 131. Id. 
 132. See id. at 642 n.28 (discussing some of the controversy in evaluating 
dose-response curves for cancer causation); see, e.g., Cano v. Everest Minerals 
Corp., 362 F. Supp. 2d 814, 849 (W.D. Tex. 2005) (summarizing case law 
regarding the particular dose-response relationship offered by the plaintiffs’ 
expert). 
 133. See Jirtle et al., supra note 36, at 261 (“These epigenetic biomarkers 
will hopefully allow for the early diagnosis of individuals with a propensity for 
adult-onset disease. . . . Such an approach to human disease management could 
revolutionize medical care, which now mainly treats diseases only after they 
develop.”). 
 Figure 2: Sample Dose-Response Curve 
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than as determinative of any causation issue on their own.134 
Therefore, plaintiffs should not be barred from recovering solely 
because they have not proven that their dose of exposure is linked 
to a threshold risk of disease.135  
IV. Alternative Models of Causation in Toxic Torts 
A. Merging General and Specific Causation 
One solution to the difficulty of proving specific causation is 
to allow general causation evidence to satisfy the specific 
causation inquiry as well.136 This approach is “based on a policy 
determination that when the incidence of a disease or injury is 
sufficiently elevated due to exposure to a substance, someone who 
was exposed to that substance and exhibits the disease or injury 
can raise a fact question on causation.”137 General causation 
must, at a minimum, be supported by strong and consistent 
epidemiological data.138 Courts can then presume specific 
causation from the statistical probabilities yielded by scientific 
data.139  
Even with this approach, courts decide a standard for 
scientific rigor before epidemiological studies can be used to prove 
the plaintiff’s case.140 This determination shapes not only the 
                                                                                                     
 134. See Gerald W. Boston, A Mass Exposure Model of Toxic Causation: The 
Content of Scientific Proof and the Regulatory Experience, 18 COLUM. J. ENVTL. 
L. 181, 240 (1993) (addressing the difficulties with determining an exact dose-
response relationship for a particular environmental agent). 
 135. Id.  
 136. See Estate of George v. Vt. League of Cities & Towns, 993 A.2d 367, 374 
(Vt. 2010) (“Notwithstanding this limitation, numerous courts have considered 
the role that epidemiological studies can play in establishing specific 
causation.”).   
 137. Merrell Dow Pharms. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 715 (Tex. 1997). 
 138. See, e.g., id. at 715 (“Recognizing that epidemiological studies cannot 
establish the actual cause of an individual’s injury or condition, a difficult 
question for the courts is how a plaintiff faced with this conundrum can raise a 
fact issue on causation and meet the ‘more likely than not’ burden of proof.”).  
 139. See Rosenberg, supra note 83, at 858 (noting that this approach 
“converts the balance of probabilities into a conclusive presumption that the 
causal connection did or did not exist between the parties in the particular 
case”).  
 140. See Tumlinson v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., No. 08C-07-106 FSS, 
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weight of scientific evidence but also whether or not certain 
experts and studies are even admissible.141 For example, in 
Estate of George v. Vermont League of Cities & Towns,142 the 
plaintiff offered eight epidemiological studies in order to support 
a workers’ compensation claim that the claimant’s years of 
firefighting caused his death from lymphoma.143 The Vermont 
Supreme Court first recognized that epidemiological evidence can 
play a role in specific causation.144 The court went on to discuss 
relative risk, concluding that the trial court’s cutoff of 2.0 was 
proper.145 Ultimately, the court upheld the trial court’s grant of 
summary judgment to the defendant, partly because the plaintiff 
failed to offer epidemiological evidence that met the relative risk 
cutoff.146 Legal standards for scientific evidence drastically affect 
a plaintiff’s ability to satisfy the causation element of a toxic tort 
claim—regardless of a court’s view of general versus specific 
causation.147 
                                                                                                     
2012 Del. Super. LEXIS 209, at *7 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 6, 2012) (discussing 
what constitutes scientifically reliable epidemiological studies for evidence of 
causation). 
 141. See, e.g., Andrew S. Lipton, Proving Toxic Harm: Getting Past Slice and 
Dice Tactics, 45 MCGEORGE L. REV. 707, 710–16 (2014) (discussing evidence 
issues associated with scientific studies and expert testimony). 
 142. 993 A.2d 367 (Vt. 2010).  
 143. See id. at 369 (“In 2003, claimant died of non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma 
(NHL). His estate brought a workers’ compensation action, alleging that his 
work as a firefighter caused him to develop NHL.”); id. at 375 (noting that the 
experts offered eight epidemiological studies).  
 144. See id. at 374 (“[N]umerous courts have considered the role that 
epidemiological studies can play in establishing specific causation.”).  
 145. See id. at 378 (“[W]e conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in considering a relative risk greater than 2.0 as a reasonable and 
helpful benchmark under the circumstances presented here.”). 
 146. See id. at 375 (“The trial court found that only two of the eight 
epidemiological studies relied upon by the experts in this case reflected a 
relative risk greater than 2.0 . . . .”); id. at 382 (concluding that summary 
judgment in favor of the defendant was proper).  
 147. See id. at 707 (noting the difficulty of proving causation with opposing 
experts and epidemiological studies).  
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B. Substantial Factor 
Courts will also invoke the “substantial factor” test as an 
alternative to but-for causation.148 Under this approach, legal 
cause is satisfied if “(a) [an actor’s] conduct is a substantial 
factor in bringing about the harm, and (b) there is no rule of law 
relieving the actor from liability because of the manner in which 
his negligence has resulted in the harm.”149 New Jersey courts 
follow this standard for toxic tort cases, noting that “[t]here is no 
requirement in the law that a single cause be found and 
proven. All that is required is that the plaintiff show that a 
defendant’s conduct or defective product was a proximate cause of 
the condition, i.e., a substantial factor in bringing the condition 
about.”150  
In Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.,151 the California 
Supreme Court invoked the substantial factor test for proving 
causation in a suit for asbestos-related injuries and wrongful 
death.152 Instead of requiring the plaintiff to prove that the 
defendant’s exact fibers caused the onset of cancer, the court 
allowed the plaintiff to prove that “exposure to defendant’s 
product was a substantial factor causing the illness.”153 The court 
elaborated that the plaintiff could satisfy this proof “by showing 
that in reasonable medical probability it was a substantial factor 
contributing to the plaintiff’s or decedent’s risk of developing 
cancer.”154  
However, the court reversed a lower court’s decision to give a 
burden-shifting instruction on causation to the jury.155 Lower 
courts in California allow for such a burden shift if “the plaintiff 
has proved that a particular asbestos supplier’s product was 
‘defective,’ that the plaintiff’s injuries or death were legally 
                                                                                                     
 148. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1967). 
 149. Id.  
 150. Grassis v. Johns-Manville Corp., 591 A.2d 671, 677 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1991). 
 151. 941 P.2d 1203 (Cal. 1997).   
 152. See id. at 1206 (summarizing the procedural and factual history of the 
case). 
 153. Id. at 1223. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 1217–18. 
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caused by asbestos exposure generally, and that he was exposed 
to asbestos fibers from the defendant’s product.”156 The defendant 
then bears the burden of proving that its product did not cause 
the harm.157 California’s Supreme Court noted that such a 
burden shift is unnecessary when the fact-finders understand the 
limits of proving causation in such cases, noting that the 
substantial factor instruction was sufficient to accomplish this 
task.158  
C. Sufficient-to-Have-Caused 
A related, yet slightly different, test for causation is the 
“sufficient-to-have-caused” standard, which requires exposure to 
be of a level able to cause the harm, even if there is limited 
evidence connecting exposure to a particularized harm.159 
Although the Second Restatement of Torts used “substantial 
factor” language, the Third Restatement of Torts rejected that 
doctrine in favor of the sufficient-to-have-caused standard.160 The 
Third Restatement, as well as several courts, has adopted this 
doctrine instead of the substantial factor test because of the 
likelihood for confusion over what constitutes a substantial 
factor.161 For example, Virginia follows the sufficient-to-
                                                                                                     
 156. Id. at 1208.  
 157. Id.  
 158. See id. at 1217–18 (“[T]he most fundamental reason why a 
burden-shifting instruction is unnecessary to proving an asbestos-related cancer 
latent injury case becomes clear when the limits on the plaintiff’s burden of 
proof on causation are properly understood.”).  
 159. See Ford Motor Co. v. Boomer, 736 S.E.2d 724, 732 (Va. 2013) (“The 
exposure must have been ‘a’ sufficient cause . . . . Excluding other exposures 
from the pool of multiple sufficient causes will require competent medical 
testimony indicating whether the timing of exposure could possibly have caused 
the [disease].”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 27 (2010) (“[C]ourts have long 
imposed liability when a tortfeasor’s conduct, while not necessary for the 
outcome, would have been a factual cause if the other competing cause had not 
been operating.”). 
 160. See Boomer, 736 S.E.2d at 730–31 (discussing the Restatement’s 
approach to multiple contributing causes and ultimately using the sufficient-to-
have-caused standard). 
 161. See id. at 730 (“[S]ubstantial contributing factor could be construed to 
mean any cause that is more than a merely de minimis factor. Conversely, the 
invocation of the term ‘substantial’ could be interpreted to raise the standard for 
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have-caused standard for mesothelioma cases where there may 
be multiple causes.162  
D. Increased Risk 
A minority of states allow plaintiffs a cause of action based 
on an increased risk of future disease, such as that resulting from 
an exposure to a carcinogen.163 Because courts do not want to 
impose liability for harms that are merely speculative, these 
claims typically must prove some accompanying immediate harm, 
such as present physical injury, emotional distress, or medical 
monitoring.164 Most courts also require that the harm is likely to 
occur based on a preponderance of the evidence and expert 
testimony.165  
One common approach to allowing increased risk claims is 
for courts to require an accompanying present physical injury to 
                                                                                                     
proof of causation beyond a mere preponderance of the evidence to some more 
elevated standard.”). 
 162. See id. at 732 (“We find that in concurring causation cases, the 
‘sufficient’-to-have-caused standard as elaborated above is the proper way to 
define the cause-in-fact element of proximate cause.”).  
 163. See, e.g., Lester v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 120 So. 3d 767, 781 (La. Ct. App. 
2013) (“[T]he Louisiana Supreme Court acknowledged a cause of action for 
damages for increased risk of contracting cancer as a valid claim . . . .”); Gideon 
v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1137 (5th Cir. 1985) (“His claim 
includes, without limitation, all damages for future pain and suffering, inability 
to work in the future, reduced life expectancy, future medical expenses, and 
future disabilities and diseases that will probably develop from present 
injuries.”).  
 164. See Schweitzer v. Consol. Rail Corp., 758 F.2d 936, 942 (3d Cir. 1985) 
(“If mere exposure to asbestos were sufficient to give rise to a F.E.L.A. cause of 
action, countless seemingly healthy railroad workers, workers who might never 
manifest injury, would have tort claims cognizable in federal court.”); Merry v. 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 684 F. Supp. 847, 848 (M.D. Pa. 1988) (noting that 
the plaintiffs are not seeking a claim for increased risk of future illness but for 
emotional distress and medical monitoring).  
 165. See Gideon, 761 F.2d at 1137–38 (“Whether the district court should 
have excluded evidence that Gideon may develop cancer turns on 
epistemology. . . . Certainty, however, is not required: the plaintiff need 
demonstrate only that the event is more likely to occur than not.”); Cudone v. 
Gehret, 821 F. Supp. 266, 270–71 (D. Del. 1993) (permitting a cognizable 
increased risk claim when experts showed that “it is more probable than not” 
that the plaintiff would experience a recurrence of cancer in her lifetime). 
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allow recovery.166 In some courts, genetic mutation and 
chromosomal damage satisfy this standard, providing one 
possible analogy to how courts might deal with epigenetic 
changes.167 In Brafford v. Susquehanna Corp.,168 the plaintiffs 
lived near a uranium milling facility in South Dakota and sued 
for increased risk of cancer and other diseases as a result of 
radiation exposure.169 The United States District Court for the 
District of Colorado, asserting diversity jurisdiction, considered 
increased risk claims to be cognizable only with present physical 
injury.170 The court denied the defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment based on expert testimony that concluded “with a 
reasonable degree of medical probability both that there has been 
chromosomal damage and that such damage was caused by the 
radiation.”171 The court noted the importance of plaintiffs’ 
“experts of national renown,” who agreed that subcellular damage 
                                                                                                     
 166. See, e.g., Brafford v. Susquehanna Corp., 586 F. Supp. 14, 17 (D. Colo. 
1984) (“[I]n order to recover future damages for enhanced cancer risk, plaintiffs 
must have suffered a definite, present physical injury.”); Capital Holding Corp. 
v. Bailey, 873 S.W.2d 187, 194 (Ky. 1994) (“It is tangible injury that triggers the 
existence of a cause of action, and then, once a harmful change has occurred the 
plaintiff may sue for the increased risk of future consequences which are 
presently compensable as a part of the cause of action that has accrued.”). 
 167. See Brafford, 586 F. Supp. at 17–18 (denying summary judgment for 
the defendant because the plaintiffs were exposed to high levels of radiation, 
which experts testified “with a reasonable degree of medical probability” caused 
chromosomal damage, satisfying the present physical injury requirement); see 
also In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether Prods. Liab. Litig., 528 F. Supp. 2d 303, 
315 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“Further, assuming that the model of carcinogenesis Dr. 
Mehlman describes is valid, as I must for the purposes of summary judgment, 
the physical manifestation of MTBE in plaintiffs’ bodies is not benign, but can 
be the first step in the development of the disease they claim to fear.”); 
Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219, 1227 (D. Mass. 1986) (“[T]he 
court did not distinguish between gross and subcellular harm. Instead, the court 
drew a line between harm which can be proven to exist through expert medical 
testimony based on objective evidence and harm which is merely speculative or 
based solely on a plaintiff's unsupported assertions.”).  
 168. 586 F. Supp. 14 (D. Colo. 1984).   
 169. See id. at 15 (noting the plaintiff’s possible tort claim based on 
increased risk of disease as a result of exposure to radiation). 
 170. See id. at 17 (discussing precedent in the jurisdiction for increased risk 
claims). 
 171. See id. at 17–18 (noting that such subcellular injury was sufficient to 
state a claim and survive a summary judgment motion from the defendant 
based on no present physical injury).  
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from radiation should be considered an injury.172 The present 
cellular damage operated to “cock the trigger” of cancer in the 
future, thus “depriv[ing] plaintiffs of a degree of immunity which 
they had enjoyed prior to their exposure.”173  
Similarly, in Werlein v. United States,174 the plaintiffs lived 
near a site contaminated by trichloroethylene175 and were 
exposed to a contaminated water supply.176 Minnesota requires a 
present physical injury for a cognizable increased risk claim.177 
The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota 
denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment based on 
the adequacy of subcellular injury for fulfilling the present 
physical injury requirement:  
Plaintiffs’ experts have testified that plaintiffs who have been 
exposed to contaminated air and drinking water have suffered 
an actual physical injury in the form of chromosomal 
breakage, and damage to the cardiovascular and immunal 
systems. . . . These experts also have testified that the present 
injuries are the cause of the alleged increased future risk of 
disease. . . . Based on the record before it, this Court cannot 
rule as a matter of law that plaintiffs’ alleged injuries are not 
“real” simply because they are subcellular. The effect of 
volatile organic compounds on the human body is a subtle, 
complex matter. It is for the trier of fact, aided by expert 
testimony, to determine whether plaintiffs have suffered 
present harm.178 
Other courts, however, view subcellular injury as too 
speculative to sustain a claim for increased risk. In Rainer v. 
Union Carbide Corp.,179 workers from a uranium-enrichment 
                                                                                                     
 172. Id. at 18. 
 173. Id.  
 174. 746 F. Supp. 887 (D. Minn. 1990).  
 175. Trichloroethylene is an industrial solvent known to cause cancer, 
primarily causing damage to the human nervous system, liver, and kidneys. See 
Trichloroethylene, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY (Apr. 1992), 
http://www.epa.gov/airtoxics/hlthef/tri-ethy.html (last updated Jan. 2000) (last 
visited Mar. 5, 2016) (summarizing the health risks of trichloroethylene) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 176. Werlein, 746 F. Supp. at 890.  
 177. See id. at 901 (discussing precedent in the jurisdiction allowing 
increased risk claims). 
 178. Id.  
 179. 402 F.3d 608 (6th Cir. 2005).  
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plant in Kentucky sued for exposure even though none had 
symptoms of clinical disease.180 The court explicitly rejected the 
subcellular-damage precedents of Brafford and Werlein, noting 
that “the issue of whether chromosome damage constitutes a 
‘present physical injury’ is essentially a legal question, not a 
factual one.”181 The court cited three public policy reasons for its 
decision.182 First, the court wanted to avoid opening the door to 
endless litigation.183 Second, the court noted that allowing this 
claim would bar future claims for injury given Kentucky’s “one 
claim” rule for tort plaintiffs.184 Last, the court discussed the 
difficulty of calculating damages where “the injuries claimed to 
date have caused no financial losses or impairments.”185 
Advances in scientific research may, however, persuade more 
courts to follow the logic of Werlein and Brafford rather than the 
logic of Rainer.  
E. Other Alternatives 
Legal scholar Steve Gold argues that none of the existing 
causation frameworks fits the science of molecular epidemiology, 
and courts should instead adopt an entirely “probabilistic causal 
contribution model.”186 This approach would consider any 
exposure as a cause if it contributed to a disease.187 Such a 
determination would require a plaintiff to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the exposure added to the 
plaintiff’s incremental risk of a disease from which the plaintiff 
                                                                                                     
 180. Id. at 611. 
 181. Id. at 621. 
 182. Id.  
 183. See id. (discussing the high number of possible plaintiffs, given 
everyday exposure to possible toxins).  
 184. See id. (noting that plaintiffs may have a better chance of recovery if 
they wait until disease symptoms manifest).  
 185. See id. at 622 (noting that the only logical damages for subcellular 
injury are those for medical monitoring because no other harms have yet 
occurred). 
 186. Gold, supra note 14, at 338–39.  
 187. See id. at 281–82 (discussing the probabilistic causal contribution 
standard).  
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suffers.188 Damages, then, would vary according to the proportion 
of risk created by the exposure.189 Gold adapts an illustration 
from the Third Restatement of Torts for why his framework fits 
scientific evidence better than the existing doctrines.190 His 
example involves three defendants—Able, Baker, and Charlie—
who collectively push a car off a mountain.191 He elaborates on 
how the fact pattern would change if it incorporated the 
uncertainties of subcellular harm and disease onset:  
 Suppose, however, that Able, Baker, and Charlie could 
not be described by Newtonian physics but only by quantum 
mechanics. On a mountaintop ringed with cars, the three 
charge around blindfolded. What is more, they are joined by 
undetectable sprites that also impart momentum to any object 
they strike. Sometimes Able, Baker, and Charlie hit a car, and 
sometimes the impact is powerful enough to tip the car down 
the hill. But this is a quantum world: if we know what they 
hit, we cannot tell how hard they hit it. And we can’t detect 
the sprite strikes at all. Every once in a while a car rolls down 
the hill. But the most science can tell us—if we can say 
whether Able, Baker, Charlie, or any combination of the three 
hit the car at some point before its descent—is the probability 
that they hit the car hard enough to make it move. 
If Able, Baker, and Charlie represent independent risk 
factors for a disease, and the invisible sprites represent 
unknown causes, then the probabilistic metaphor fits a wide 
range of toxic tort cases.192  
Gold’s approach would allow courts to determine causation 
according to scientific probabilities related to exposure and 
disease onset.193 
                                                                                                     
 188. See id. (noting that the plaintiff’s case “would be shown by a 
preponderance of the evidence . . . to have added incremental risk that the 
plaintiff would develop a disease that the plaintiff in fact developed”). 
 189. See id. (“Damages should be apportioned to that contributing factor in 
proportion to its contribution to the plaintiff's risk.”).  
 190. Id. at 283.  
 191. See id. (describing how the illustration would work using Newtonian 
physics—a certain amount of force pushes the car over the mountain, and each 
defendant contributes a portion of that force).  
 192. Id. at 283.  
 193. See id. at 303–04 (“Because such measures will continue to be the type 
of evidence that science can provide, it is time for a corresponding probabilistic 
contributing-factor model of causation.”). 
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Yet another option is to take the legal analysis entirely out of 
the problem and present scientific issues to a “science panel” that 
would then decide scientific issues on behalf of the court.194 
Ontario, for example, uses an Industrial Disease Standards Panel 
for workers’ compensation claims.195 The Panel’s role is to 
“investigate potential industrial diseases, make findings about 
the causal connection between disease and exposure, specify 
criteria for evaluation of claims, and advise compensation boards 
about eligibility rules.”196 In the United States, a few judges have 
appointed science panels when expert testimony on causation 
conflicted.197 Like the probabilistic causal model, a science panel 
would be able to weigh scientific evidence regarding statistics and 
probabilities and come to a conclusion on causation.198 
V. Adapting Causation Doctrine to Epigenetic Evidence 
Scientific research is progressing quickly, and there are 
many epidemiological studies linking environmental conditions, 
epigenetic markers, and various diseases.199 Legal scholarship 
addressing epigenetic harms focuses on broad impacts to tort 
liability and regulatory governance, particularly in the field of 
                                                                                                     
 194. See Troyen A. Brennan, Helping Courts with Toxic Torts: Some 
Proposals Regarding Alternative Methods for Presenting and Assessing Scientific 
Evidence in Common Law Courts, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 10 (1989) (“The science 
panel . . . is a panel of scientists, possibly aided by lawyers and concerned 
citizens, who adjudicate a specific question regarding a technical dispute and 
formulate a consensus opinion. . . . [T]he science panel would provide a 
consensus opinion on a given causal dispute for the court.”).   
 195. See id. at 16 (discussing ways in which scientists have played a role in 
the legal causation framework).  
 196. Id. 
 197. See Laural L. Hooper et al., Assessing Causation in Breast Implant 
Litigation: The Role of Science Panels, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139, 140–41 
(2001) (“[F]ederal judges appointed panels of scientific experts to help assess 
conflicting scientific testimony regarding causation of systemic injuries by 
silicone gel breast implants.”). 
 198. See Brennan, supra note 194, at 19 (“[J]udges and most people are used 
to thinking about causation in terms of mechanistic causal chains. Scientists, 
however, rely to a large extent, especially in the science of toxicology, on 
probabilistic evidence of causation and statistical proof of propositions.”).  
 199. See supra Part II (discussing the state of epigenetic science and its 
relevance for toxic tort cases). 
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transgenerational harms.200 For example, legal scholar 
Christopher Weiner focuses on precedent allowing 
transgenerational liability for harm, particularly when dealing 
with a preconception tort.201 University of Georgia Professor of 
Law Fazal Khan analyzes the potential regulatory issues that 
need to be addressed as science develops in this field.202 Other 
scholars examine the public health and social justice impacts of 
transgenerational epigenetic harms—particularly those resulting 
from poor nutrition and stressful environments.203 Although this 
scholarship provides an important overview of general legal 
issues associated with epigenetics, an in-depth analysis of each 
individual issue is necessary for preparing the legal system to 
deal with new scientific evidence.  
Thus, this Note addresses how courts should handle 
epidemiological evidence of epigenetic harms in toxic tort cases. 
This Note argues that (1) rather than using a bright-line 
scientific cutoff for admissibility or sufficiency of evidence, courts 
should defer to the fact-finder for evaluating scientific evidence, 
and the fact-finder should weigh epidemiological evidence in the 
context of the other evidence available in a case; (2) epigenetic 
harms should be considered present physical injury sufficient to 
support a claim for increased risk of disease, following the model 
of the subcellular injury cases;204 and (3) within such a claim, the 
                                                                                                     
 200. See generally Christopher J. Weiner, Transgenerational Tort Liability 
for Epigenetic Disease, 13 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 319 (2011) (proposing a 
framework for transgenerational tort liability for epigenetic harms); Khan, 
supra note 81 (analyzing how tort cases and regulations can be used to manage 
epigenetic harms and promote fairness and justice); Mark A. Rothstein, 
Epigenetic Exceptionalism: Currents in Contemporary Bioethics, 41 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 733 (2013) (discussing whether epigenetics should be regulated as its 
own field or whether existing regulations and doctrines addressing genetics 
should be modified to incorporate epigenetic science).  
 201. See Weiner, supra note 200, at 326–27 (discussing how preconception 
tort liability could evolve with epigenetic evidence).   
 202. See Khan, supra note 81, at 277 (“This article proposes a dynamic 
regulatory framework allowing for decisive actions against epigenetic threats 
without conclusive proof of harm, but requiring continual adaptation as new 
learning becomes available.”).  
 203. See Geronimus, supra note 75, at S56 (“Ultimately, such findings offer 
new hope of identifying means to short circuit the processes—both social and 
biological—whereby membership in a racialized, gendered, and economically 
stratified society may lead to health inequalities.”). 
 204. See supra Part IV.D.1 (discussing how courts have handled genetic and 
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general and specific causation inquiries should be merged when 
appropriate. 
A. Evidentiary Issues 
Although bright-line rules for admissibility and sufficiency of 
evidence simplify the judicial task, they can also unfairly and 
unreasonably bar recovery.205 Scientific research and evidence 
simply do not follow the confines of legal causation doctrine.206 
The biological onset of disease after exposure is rarely, if ever, 
certain.207 Even with a full understanding of the epigenetic 
mechanisms leading to certain diseases, proving the specific 
causal sequence for an individual plaintiff will remain difficult.208 
Most scientific research on epigenetic harms will be in the form of 
epidemiological studies and population-level data, yielding 
parameters such as relative risk and dose-response curves.209  
Many courts deal with these evidentiary uncertainties by 
unnecessarily excluding or scrutinizing scientific data, requiring 
each individual study to meet arbitrary cutoffs before it can be 
admitted or considered sufficient for a plaintiff’s case.210 This 
                                                                                                     
chromosomal damage in increased risk cases). 
 205. See supra notes 116–123 and accompanying text (discussing courts that 
have chosen to avoid bright-line rules for expert testimony and epidemiological 
evidence).  
 206. See Gold, supra note 14, at 276 (“But the law must understand how 
science can best contribute. That understanding begins with acceptance of the 
fact that bringing toxicological understanding to the molecular level will not 
bring causation to the individual level.”). 
 207. See id. at 280 (“At a molecular level, many of the processes associated 
with toxicity and disease are simply random.”). 
 208. See id. at 276 (“Thus, finding that a plaintiff does or does not have 
a . . . susceptibility to the disease-causing effect of a substance to which the 
plaintiff was exposed will provide probabilistic but not deterministic evidence of 
causation or its absence.”).  
 209. See id. (“The data will still be about relative risk, but risk will be 
parsed more and more finely. . . . [N]ew associations will be detected or known 
associations will be disaggregated in new ways. This process has already begun 
even for causal connections that were already relatively well-accepted.”).  
 210. See Lipton, supra note 141, at 709 (“[C]ourts have aggressively 
exercised their gatekeeper roles to reject expert causation testimony . . . by 
taking an atomistic approach that examines individually and independently 
each piece of scientific evidence . . . .”). 
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method is known as the “corpuscular approach” because it breaks 
down a holistic case into small, easily attacked segments.211 This 
approach, however, ignores the evidentiary strength of 
aggregating multiple scientific studies with the specific facts of a 
plaintiff’s case.212 By attacking the scientific rigor of each 
individual study, a defendant can unfairly bias the court against 
a plaintiff’s case.213  
To avoid this unfair bias, courts should liberally admit 
epidemiological evidence regarding the links between epigenetic 
harms and disease. Furthermore, courts should allow the 
fact-finder significant discretion in weighing the totality of 
scientific evidence.214 Ultimately, causation is a subjective legal 
inquiry, although scientific and legal guidelines can direct the 
analysis.215 Scientific inquiries simply do not follow the linear, 
but-for causation demanded by the legal system.216 The causation 
inquiry, then, should be left to the fact-finder rather than 
requiring an arbitrary threshold as a matter of law.217 
                                                                                                     
 211. Id. 
 212. See id. at 710 (“[T]he well-recognized weight-of-the-evidence 
methodology . . . permits scientific opinions based upon conclusions drawn from 
the totality of the evidence, with no individual study or piece of data having to 
be sufficient on its own to prove causation.”).  
 213. See Thomas O. McGarity, Proposal for Linking Culpability and 
Causation to Ensure Corporate Accountability for Toxic Risks, 26 WM. & MARY 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y. REV. 1, 19 (2001) (noting that epidemiological studies almost 
always have flaws and uncertainties that can be used to defeat a plaintiff’s 
case). 
 214. See supra notes 116–123 and accompanying text (discussing courts that 
have decided to allow the jury discretion in evaluating scientific evidence rather 
than deciding the weight based on arbitrary scientific parameters).  
 215. See, e.g., King v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 762 N.W.2d 24, 39 
(Neb. 2009) (“But determining causation differs from the objective inquiry into 
relative risk. An assessment of a causal relationship is not a scientific 
methodology as that term is used to describe logic (like a syllogism) and analytic 
methods. Instead, it involves subjective judgment.”). 
 216. See supra notes 205–209 and accompanying text (discussing the 
fundamental disconnect between scientific evidence and legal doctrines of 
causation). 
 217. See, e.g., King, 762 N.W.2d at 46–47 (declining to set a minimum 
threshold for relative risk or other statistical measurements and noting that 
“the significance of epidemiological studies with weak positive associations is a 
question of weight, not admissibility”). 
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B. Increased Risk Framework 
Epigenetic evidence may address many of the law’s concerns 
with increased risk claims in toxic tort cases, allowing these 
claims to proceed with more success.218 One criticism of the 
increased risk approach is that it still operates within but-for 
causation: each exposure is a but-for cause of an increase in 
risk.219 As scientific research progresses, links between exposure, 
increased risk, and disease onset will become more readily 
available for proving a plaintiff’s case.220 Epidemiological data 
should fill in many of the causal gaps between exposure and 
disease.221 Applying but-for causation to the increased risk 
framework might become possible as certain epigenetic markers 
are connected to certain levels of exposure and disease.222 This 
type of evidence, however, will only support general causation, 
meaning that courts will still need to grapple with how to analyze 
specific causation.223  
Another criticism is that tort law cannot and should not 
compensate every individual exposed to a risk.224 Otherwise, 
                                                                                                     
 218. See supra Part III.C (discussing the increased risk framework and the 
primary reasons why courts are reluctant to allow such claims). 
 219. See Gold, supra note 14, at 298–99 (“With respect to causation doctrine, 
however, it implicitly retreated to the comfortable confines of but-for: each 
material exposure to asbestos, tautologically, was a but-for cause of the 
increment of risk associated with that exposure.”). 
 220. See Brafford v. Susquehanna Corp., 586 F. Supp. 14, 18 (D. Colo. 1984) 
(describing the link between subcellular damage and disease onset as having 
the “trigger cocked” on cancer and as depriving the plaintiff of a level of 
immunity against disease); see also supra Part II (discussing the link between 
epigenetic markers and disease onset).  
 221. See supra Part II (discussing the state of epidemiologic data and how 
epigenetic studies are likely to reveal many more disease mechanisms than 
previously known). 
222. See supra Parts II, III.C (discussing the progress of epigenetic science 
and the demands of the increased risk framework). 
 223. See Gold, supra note 14, at 278–79 (“[T]he enormous number of possible 
combinations of potentially interacting causal factors—genes, epigenetics, other 
individual characteristics, and exposures—makes it extraordinarily unlikely 
that complete risk characterization will ever be possible at an individual level.”). 
 224. See id. at 299–300 (“The latter would invite the objection that many 
negligent or otherwise wrongful acts create risk of harm, but tort law ordinarily 
does not, and practicably could not, compensate every person exposed to such 
risks.”). 
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individuals would receive compensation based on harms that may 
never materialize, creating unnecessary and unending liability 
for defendants.225 Epigenetic changes, however, provide evidence 
of exposure (and harm) before disease symptoms occur and can 
even provide evidence of ancestral exposure to toxins.226 Courts 
can therefore treat the epigenetic change either as harm itself (as 
in the genetic and subcellular damage cases) or as distinct 
evidence of risk exposure itself.227 Either approach would limit 
the liability for increased risk because not every exposed 
individual would show the epigenetic abnormalities necessary for 
disease onset.228 Courts could limit recovery by requiring 
plaintiffs to prove epigenetic abnormalities associated with both 
exposure and disease. Similarly, only defendants who created 
risks sufficient for epigenetic harm would be held liable—this 
standard would address the concerns over limitless liability for 
negligence without resulting harm. Therefore, this approach 
would limit liability while still compensating those harmed and 
serving the additional deterrent purpose of the tort system.229  
C. Addressing General and Specific Causation 
                                                                                                     
 225. See Stites v. Sunstrand Heat Transfer, Inc., 660 F. Supp. 1516, 1526 
(W.D. Mich. 1987) (“Accepting plaintiffs’ risk of cancer claim in this instance 
may allow plaintiffs to recover, from a jury, monetary relief for an injury they 
are not reasonably certain to suffer.”); Hagerty v. L & L Marine Servs., Inc., 788 
F.2d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 1986) (“[W]e conclude that a plaintiff can recover only 
where he can show that the toxic exposure more probably than not will lead to 
cancer.”).  
 226. See Manikkam, supra note 65, at 5 (“[D]istinct epigenetic changes in 
differential DNA methylation regions (DMR) provide epigenetic biomarkers for 
ancestral environmental exposures. Each exposure had a distinct epigenetic 
signature that can be used as a biomarker. . . . [T]he current study provides the 
proof of concept that epigenetic biomarkers for environmental exposures exist.”). 
 227. See supra Part III.C.1 (discussing case precedent allowing subcellular 
injury to fulfill the present physical injury requirement in increased risk cases); 
see also Erik S. Knutsen, Ambiguous Cause-in-Fact and Structured Causation: A 
Multi-Jurisdictional Approach, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 249, 275 (“An increased risk 
would be treated as a new compensable injury for which a defendant would be 
liable. Exposure to risk of harm would be considered a harm itself.”). 
 228. See supra Part II (discussing how epigenetic change varies across 
individuals, even when exposed to the same environmental conditions).  
 229. See McGarity, supra note 213, at 35–38 (summarizing how the current 
toxic tort evidentiary standards inhibit the deterrence goals of the tort system). 
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Most uncertainty associated with causation in toxic tort cases 
falls into one of four categories: (1) trans-scientific uncertainty, 
when scientific relationships are inferred from existing studies 
but not yet proven by epidemiological data; (2) statistical 
uncertainty, when scientific evidence is ambiguous due to sample 
sizes and other experimental set-up issues; (3) individual 
attribution uncertainty, which deals with the issues surrounding 
specific causation; and (4) vocabulary or multiple causation 
uncertainty, when the scientific jargon and methodology create 
confusion for the court in applying legal doctrines to evidence.230 
Of these, individual attribution uncertainty and statistical 
uncertainty are typically key considerations for epidemiological 
evidence.231  
When these uncertainties combine with the errors and biases 
inherent in scientific research, proving causation becomes 
extremely difficult for a toxic tort plaintiff.232 Because of these 
challenges, courts should accept consistent, peer-reviewed 
epidemiological evidence as specific causation, leaving the weight 
of the evidence to be determined by the fact-finder.233 In doing so, 
courts would follow the precedent of the states using a “weak” 
view of causation.234 Plaintiffs should not recover solely on the 
basis of epidemiological data, but a lack of specific causation 
should not bar recovery when plaintiffs otherwise present a 
strong case.235 Such evidence should at least allow a plaintiff to 
                                                                                                     
 230. See Brennan, supra note 194, at 23–26 (summarizing how causal 
uncertainty in toxic tort cases relates to the challenges of using scientific 
evidence).  
 231. See id. (listing the circumstances under which these various issues are 
at play in the legal determination of causation).  
 232. See supra notes 205–213 and accompanying text (addressing how 
defendants can easily attack scientific evidence due to the uncertainties 
inherent in the scientific process).  
 233. See supra note 123 and accompanying text (discussing various 
standards for treating epidemiological data as specific causation).  
 234. See supra notes 84–85 and accompanying text (comparing the “strong” 
and “weak” approaches to causation). 
 235. See Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247, 418 (D. Utah 1984) (“Nor 
is the court constrained by simplistic models of causal probability impressed 
upon the judicial ‘preponderance of the evidence’ standard.”), rev’d on other 
grounds, 816 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1987); Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 
953 S.W.2d 706, 720–21 (Tex. 1997) (“Courts should allow a party . . . to present 
the best available evidence . . . and only then should a court determine from a 
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survive a summary judgment motion in a toxic tort case, allowing 
the fact-finder to decide based on the full record of scientific and 
legal evidence.236  
Evidence of epigenetic harm would still face the common 
problems with general and specific causation.237 As science 
connects environmental factors, epigenetic change, and disease 
onset, epidemiological data will develop to support general 
causation.238 Proving the specific instance of exposure that led to 
the epigenetic change, however, will remain difficult.239 As a 
result, these two inquiries should be merged into one. In other 
words, strong epidemiological data—ideally peer-reviewed, 
consistent, and accepted by scientific experts—should satisfy 
specific causation as well.  
D. Difficulties and Alternative Solutions 
Alternatives to developing common law doctrine on causation 
include passing legislation or regulations addressing either the 
evidentiary issues or the factors that are known to cause 
epigenetic harms leading to disease. For example, one legal 
scholar suggests amending the Federal Rules of Evidence so that 
                                                                                                     
totality of the evidence, considering all factors affecting the reliability of 
particular studies, whether there is legally sufficient evidence to support a 
judgment.”). 
 236. See, e.g., In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig. v. U.S. Mineral Prods. 
Co., 52 F.3d 1124, 1134 (2d Cir. 1995) (“We believe that it would be far 
preferable for the district court to instruct the jury on statistical significance 
and then let the jury decide whether many studies over the 1.0 mark have any 
significance in combination.”); see also supra notes 205–217 and accompanying 
text (arguing for leaving most of the evidentiary decisions to the fact-finder). 
 237. See Gold, supra note 14, at 278–79 (“[T]he enormous number of possible 
combinations of potentially interacting causal factors—genes, epigenetics, other 
individual characteristics, and exposures—makes it extraordinarily unlikely 
that complete risk characterization will ever be possible at an individual level.”).  
 238. See id. at 278 (“Toxicogenomics and molecular epidemiology are 
producing evidence about suspected exposure-disease links at finer and finer 
scales of resolution, but they have not altered the essential nature of that 
evidence.”).  
 239. See id. at 279 (“For the most part, increased knowledge of toxicity at 
the genomic and molecular levels will simply provide an increasingly detailed 
description of probabilistic associations—population-based frequencies rather 
than deterministic certainties.”).   
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judges no longer act as “super-scientists” who scrutinize every 
epidemiologic study.240 Such an amendment would supersede the 
current precedent of Daubert and Joiner.241 Furthermore, if 
factors causing epigenetic harm and disease were fully regulated 
(for example, if products causing epigenetic harm were banned), 
then courts would play a less important role in the toxic tort 
system.242  
Even so, in the event that epigenetic harms were to be  
highly regulated, lawsuits would still arise, and courts would still 
need to address the causation and evidentiary issues.243 
Regulations and legislation both require extensive inputs of time, 
political energy, money, and scientific backing.244 With the 
current rate of epigenetic research, courts will likely face these 
cases before legislators are able to fully regulate the field, and 
courts need to be prepared to handle both epigenetic evidence and 
epigenetic harms. Ultimately, however, protection from 
epigenetic harms and disease will require all three branches of 
government to work in concert.245 Even as courts address these 
issues, regulations should be developed to minimize the health 
risks of the factors known to lead to the worst epigenetic harms—
endocrine disruptors, for example. Indeed, California already 
includes epigenetic toxicity as a hazard in its state regulations.246  
Calculating damages presents one difficulty with an 
increased risk approach to epigenetic harms, particularly if 
epigenetic damage is present but not causing any physical or 
                                                                                                     
 240. See McGarity, supra note 213, at 42 (“One possible ‘quick fix’ to 
forestall the upcoming accountability crisis would be for Congress to amend the 
Federal Rules of Evidence to remove (or greatly reduce) the trial judge’s 
screening role.”). 
 241. Id. 
 242. See Khan, supra note 81, at 262–65 (discussing how dynamic regulation 
of epigenetic health risks is preferable to handling harms through the toxic tort 
system). 
 243. See generally id. (comparing how a comprehensive regulatory 
framework for epigenetic harms would interact with the tort system).   
 244. See id. at 310–14 (discussing barriers to establishing a comprehensive 
epigenetics regulatory framework). 
 245. See Khan, supra note 81, at 261–65 (discussing how to best protect 
populations from epigenetic harms). 
 246. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 69403.4 (2012).  
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emotional symptoms.247 The same courts allowing subcellular 
damage to support an increased risk claim have addressed this 
very issue, considering damages associated with medical 
monitoring and other harms.248 This model should translate to 
cases dealing with epigenetic harms. 
VI. Conclusion 
Courts already struggle with the issue of causation in toxic 
tort cases.249 As a result, courts, experts, and scholars have 
argued for many different approaches to proving causation in 
toxic tort cases.250 Epigenetic research has the potential to assist 
courts by providing more nuanced scientific evidence on causal 
mechanisms.  
Evidence of epigenetic change fits most closely within the 
increased risk framework of tort liability because it provides the 
intermediate causal link between environmental stressors and 
disease onset.251 By relying on such evidence, courts can limit 
liability while compensating individuals with an increased risk of 
disease and incentivizing behaviors that limit environmental 
exposures likely to result in adverse epigenetic effects. Courts can 
either follow the precedent of subcellular damage as present 
physical injury or look to epigenetic evidence as proof of increased 
                                                                                                     
 247. See Rainer v. Union Carbide Corp., 402 F.3d 608, 622 (6th Cir. 2005) 
(“[T]he plaintiffs have suggested no mechanisms for calculating losses resulting 
from subcellular damage. Indeed, the injuries claimed to date have caused no 
financial losses or impairments.”). 
 248. See, e.g., Brafford v. Susquehanna Corp., 586 F. Supp. 14, 17–18 (D. 
Colo. 1984) (discussing the defendant’s arguments against damages on a 
summary judgment motion and acknowledging that the plaintiff should have 
the opportunity to prove damages at trial). 
 249. See Brennan, supra note 194, at 19 (“[J]udges and most people are used 
to thinking about causation in terms of mechanistic causal chains. Scientists, 
however, rely to a large extent, especially in the science of toxicology, on 
probabilistic evidence of causation and statistical proof of propositions.”).  
 250.  See supra Part III (documenting the varying approaches used to 
address the causation issue in toxic tort cases). 
 251. See Jirtle & Skinner, supra note 133, at 254 (“Environmental exposures 
to nutritional, chemical and physical factors have the potential to alter gene 
expression and modify adult disease susceptibility in various ways through 
changes in the epigenome.”). 
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risk.252 These approaches, however, still face difficulty in proving 
specific causation. Because of the unique characteristics of toxic 
tort cases, the causation inquiry should be merged and left to the 
jury if evidence of specific causation is lacking.253 
Epigenetics presents a number of issues for the current legal 
system, and causation in toxic tort cases is but one. Some 
scholars argue that epigenetic harms should be regulated rather 
than litigated.254 Moving forward, epigenetic harm will also 
require courts to deal with preconception torts and 
transgenerational liability.255 Courts, therefore, must determine 
how to analyze epigenetic evidence. Even if epigenetic risks 
become highly regulated, courts will have to deal with related 
litigation. They will also become the intermediary “regulatory” 
bodies by mediating harms while the administrative and 
executive branches develop regulations. Some plaintiffs are 
already introducing epigenetic harm as evidence, and this process 
will only accelerate as scientific development continues.256 Most 
importantly, the legal and regulatory system should be informed 
about scientific developments in epigenetics and prepare 
accordingly for cases and issues that are likely to arise.  
In one court’s own words, “Based upon the average 
American’s exposure to chemically processed foods, toxic fumes, 
                                                                                                     
 252. See supra note 167 and accompanying text (discussing cases accepting 
genetic and chromosomal damage as present physical injury). 
 253. See, e.g., In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig. v. U.S. Mineral Prods. 
Co., 52 F.3d 1124, 1134 (2d Cir. 1995) (“We believe that it would be far 
preferable for the district court to instruct the jury on statistical significance 
and then let the jury decide whether many studies over the 1.0 mark have any 
significance in combination.”); supra Part III.B (discussing the role of scientific 
evidence in proving causation).  
 254. See Khan, supra note 81, at 264 (“[T]ort law appears incapable of 
limiting epigenetic risk.”). 
 255. See Weiner, supra note 201, at 336 (“It would be unreasonable to expect 
that as our understanding progresses, aggrieved children would never seek to 
hold their parents liable for the risks and illnesses needlessly suffered because 
of the parents’ tortious acts.”).  
 256. See Snyder v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 01-
162V, 2009 WL 332044, at *47–50 (Fed. Cl. Feb. 12, 2009) (discussing the role of 
epigenetics in the development of autism in a case under the National Vaccine 
Injury Compensation Program); see also Allen v. Takeda Pharms. N. Am. Inc. 
(In re Actos (Pioglitazone) Prods. Liab. Litig.), No. 12-cv-00064, 2014 WL 46818, 
at *1 (W.D. La. Jan. 6, 2014) (discussing epigenetic harm as part of the evidence 
at issue). 
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genetically modified fruits and vegetables, mercury-laden fish, 
and hormonally treated chicken and beef, [plaintiffs] might 
encompass a very large percentage of the total population.”257 
Perhaps instead of fearing “too many” plaintiffs, our legal system 
should be more concerned with protecting the public from the 
health risks of such exposures. By admitting and considering 
epidemiological evidence of epigenetic harm, courts can address 
public health while limiting liability to those harmed—even if the 
harm is limited to subcellular damage. Although compensation 
would not restore a plaintiff’s health, it might provide some 
measure of assistance to those affected. The children in Flint, 
Michigan could seek recourse through our tort system armed 
with the most recent scientific research—without fearing 
arbitrary legal standards that might bar their claims or their 
evidence. This Note’s recommendations solve one major challenge 
created by the disconnect between scientific evidence and legal 
doctrine, but many more obstacles remain for both the legal and 
public health fields.  
                                                                                                     
 257. Rainer v. Union Carbide Corp., 402 F.3d 608, 621 (6th Cir. 2005).  
